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Report Education. Shavelson , Robert L. Linn , Eva L. Baker , Helen F. Shepard , Paul E. Download PDF. By Eva L. Baker, Paul E. Ladd, Robert L. Shavelson, and Lorrie A. Every classroom should have a well-educated, professional teacher, and school systems should recruit, prepare, and retain teachers who are qualified to do the job. Yet in practice, American public schools generally do a poor job of systematically developing and evaluating teachers. But there is not strong evidence to indicate either that the departing teachers would actually be the weakest teachers, or that the departing teachers would be replaced by more effective ones.
There is also little or no evidence for the claim that teachers will be more motivated to improve student learning if teachers are evaluated or monetarily rewarded for student test score gains.
A review of the technical evidence leads us to conclude that, although standardized test scores of students are one piece of information for school leaders to use to make judgments about teacher effectiveness, such scores should be only a part of an overall comprehensive evaluation.
Based on the evidence, we consider this unwise. Any sound evaluation will necessarily involve a balancing of many factors that provide a more accurate view of what teachers in fact do in the classroom and how that contributes to student learning. Recent statistical advances have made it possible to look at student achievement gains after adjusting for some student and school characteristics.
VAM methods have also contributed to stronger analyses of school progress, program influences, and the validity of evaluation methods than were previously possible. Nonetheless, there is broad agreement among statisticians, psychometricians, and economists that student test scores alone are not sufficiently reliable and valid indicators of teacher effectiveness to be used in high-stakes personnel decisions, even when the most sophisticated statistical applications such as value-added modeling are employed.
For a variety of reasons, analyses of VAM results have led researchers to doubt whether the methodology can accurately identify more and less effective teachers. VAM estimates have proven to be unstable across statistical models, years, and classes that teachers teach. Thus, a teacher who appears to be very ineffective in one year might have a dramatically different result the following year. The same dramatic fluctuations were found for teachers ranked at the bottom in the first year of analysis.
A study designed to test this question used VAM methods to assign effects to teachers after controlling for other factors, but applied the model backwards to see if credible results were obtained. For these and other reasons, the research community has cautioned against the heavy reliance on test scores, even when sophisticated VAM methods are used, for high stakes decisions such as pay, evaluation, or tenure.
VAM results should not serve as the sole or principal basis for making consequential decisions about teachers. There are many pitfalls to making causal attributions of teacher effectiveness on the basis of the kinds of data available from typi cal school districts. We still lack sufficient understanding of how seriously the different tech nical problems threaten the validity of such interpretations. The estimates from VAM modeling of achievement will often be too imprecise to support some of the desired inferences….
The research base is currently insufficient to support the use of VAM for high-stakes decisions about individual teachers or schools. A number of factors have been found to have strong influences on student learning gains, aside from the teachers to whom their scores would be attached. These factors also include school conditions—such as the quality of curriculum materials, specialist or tutoring supports, class size, and other factors that affect learning.
Student test score gains are also strongly influenced by school attendance and a variety of out-of-school learning experiences at home, with peers, at museums and libraries, in summer programs, on-line, and in the community. Well-educated and supportive parents can help their children with homework and secure a wide variety of other advantages for them. Other children have parents who, for a variety of reasons, are unable to support their learning academically. Student test score gains are also influenced by family resources, student health, family mobility, and the influence of neighborhood peers and of classmates who may be relatively more advantaged or disadvantaged.
Research shows that summer gains and losses are quite substantial. A research summary concludes that while students overall lose an average of about one month in reading achievement over the summer, lower-income students lose significantly more, and middle-income students may actually gain in reading proficiency over the summer, creating a widening achievement gap.
Recognizing the technical and practical limitations of what test scores can accurately reflect, we conclude that changes in test scores should be used only as a modest part of a broader set of evidence about teacher practice. Besides concerns about statistical methodology, other practical and policy considerations weigh against heavy reliance on student test scores to evaluate teachers. Research shows that an excessive focus on basic math and reading scores can lead to narrowing and over-simplifying the curriculum to only the subjects and formats that are tested, reducing the attention to science, history, the arts, civics, and foreign language, as well as to writing, research, and more complex problem-solving tasks.
Tying teacher evaluation and sanctions to test score results can discourage teachers from wanting to work in schools with the neediest students, while the large, unpredictable variation in the results and their perceived unfairness can undermine teacher morale. Surveys have found that teacher attrition and demoralization have been associated with test-based accountability efforts, particularly in high-need schools.
Individual teacher rewards based on comparative student test results can also create disincentives for teacher collaboration. Better schools are collaborative institutions where teachers work across classroom and grade-level boundaries toward the common goal of educating all children to their maximum potential. They use systematic observation protocols with well-developed, research-based criteria to examine teaching, including observations or videotapes of classroom practice, teacher interviews, and artifacts such as lesson plans, assignments, and samples of student work.
Evaluation by competent supervisors and peers, employing such approaches, should form the foundation of teacher evaluation systems, with a supplemental role played by multiple measures of student learning gains that, where appropriate, could include test scores. Some districts have found ways to identify, improve, and as necessary, dismiss teachers using strategies like peer assistance and evaluation that offer intensive mentoring and review panels. These and other approaches should be the focus of experimentation by states and districts.
Adopting an invalid teacher evaluation system and tying it to rewards and sanctions is likely to lead to inaccurate personnel decisions and to demoralize teachers, causing talented teachers to avoid high-needs students and schools, or to leave the profession entirely, and discouraging potentially effective teachers from entering it. Legislatures should not mandate a test-based approach to teacher evaluation that is unproven and likely to harm not only teachers, but also the children they instruct.
Every classroom should have a well-educated, professional teacher. For that to happen, school systems should recruit, prepare, and retain teachers who are qualified to do the job.
Once in the classroom, teachers should be evaluated on a regular basis in a fair and systematic way. Effective teachers should be retained, and those with remediable shortcomings should be guided and trained further.
Ineffective teachers who do not improve should be removed. In practice, American public schools generally do a poor job of systematically developing and evaluating teachers. School districts often fall short in efforts to improve the performance of less effective teachers, and failing that, of removing them. Principals typically have too broad a span of control frequently supervising as many as 30 teachers , and too little time and training to do an adequate job of assessing and supporting teachers.
Many principals are themselves unprepared to evaluate the teachers they supervise. Due process requirements in state law and union contracts are sometimes so cumbersome that terminating ineffective teachers can be quite difficult, except in the most extreme cases. In addition, some critics believe that typical teacher compensation systems provide teachers with insufficient incentives to improve their performance. Some advocates of this approach expect the provision of performance-based financial rewards to induce teachers to work harder and thereby increase their effectiveness in raising student achievement.
Others expect that the apparent objectivity of test-based measures of teacher performance will permit the expeditious removal of ineffective teachers from the profession and will encourage less effective teachers to resign if their pay stagnates. Some believe that the prospect of higher pay for better performance will attract more effective teachers to the profession and that a flexible pay scale, based in part on test-based measures of effectiveness, will reduce the attrition of more qualified teachers whose commitment to teaching will be strengthened by the prospect of greater financial rewards for success.
Encouragement from the administration and pressure from advocates have already led some states to adopt laws that require greater reliance on student test scores in the evaluation, discipline, and compensation of teachers.
Other states are considering doing so. But there is no current evidence to indicate either that the departing teachers would actually be the weakest teachers, or that the departing teachers would be replaced by more effective ones. Nor is there empirical verification for the claim that teachers will improve student learning if teachers are evaluated based on test score gains or are monetarily rewarded for raising scores.
NCLB has used student test scores to evaluate schools, with clear negative sanctions for schools and, sometimes, their teachers whose students fail to meet expected performance standards. We can judge the success or failure of this policy by examining results on the National Assessment of Educational Progress NAEP , a federally administered test with low stakes, given to a small but statistically representative sample of students in each state.
The NCLB approach of test-based accountability promised to close achievement gaps, particularly for minority students. Scores rose at a much more rapid rate before NCLB in fourth grade math and in eighth grade reading, and rose faster after NCLB in fourth grade reading and slightly faster in eighth grade math.
These data do not support the view that that test-based accountability increases learning gains. Table 1 shows only simple annual rates of growth, without statistical controls. A recent careful econometric study of the causal effects of NCLB concluded that during the NCLB years, there were noticeable gains for students overall in fourth grade math achievement, smaller gains in eighth grade math achievement, but no gains at all in fourth or eighth grade reading achievement.
The study did not compare pre- and post-NCLB gains. Such findings provide little support for the view that test-based incentives for schools or individual teachers are likely to improve achievement, or for the expectation that such incentives for individual teachers will suffice to produce gains in student learning.
As we show in what follows, research and experience indicate that approaches to teacher evaluation that rely heavily on test scores can lead to narrowing and over-simplifying the curriculum, and to misidentifying both successful and unsuccessful teachers. These and other problems can undermine teacher morale, as well as provide disincentives for teachers to take on the neediest students. When attached to individual merit pay plans, such approaches may also create disincentives for teacher collaboration.
In truth, although payment for professional employees in the private sector is sometimes related to various aspects of their performance, the measurement of this performance almost never depends on narrow quantitative measures analogous to test scores in education.
Rather, private-sector managers almost always evaluate their professional and lower-management employees based on qualitative reviews by supervisors; quantitative indicators are used sparingly and in tandem with other evidence. Management experts warn against significant use of quantitative measures for making salary or bonus decisions.
Other human service sectors, public and private, have also experimented with rewarding professional employees by simple measures of performance, with comparably unfortunate results. When the U. The counselors also began to concentrate on those unemployed workers who were most able to find jobs on their own, diminishing their attention to those whom the employment programs were primarily designed to help. A third reason for skepticism is that in practice, and especially in the current tight fiscal environment, performance rewards are likely to come mostly from the redistribution of already-appropriated teacher compensation funds, and thus are not likely to be accompanied by a significant increase in average teacher salaries unless public funds are supplemented by substantial new money from foundations, as is currently the situation in Washington, D.
If performance rewards do not raise average teacher salaries, the potential for them to improve the average effectiveness of recruited teachers is limited and will result only if the more talented of prospective teachers are more likely than the less talented to accept the risks that come with an uncertain salary. Once again, there is no evidence on this point. And finally, it is important for the public to recognize that the standardized tests now in use are not perfect, and do not provide unerring measurements of student achievement.
These tests are unlike the more challenging open-ended examinations used in high-achieving nations in the world. This seemingly paradoxical situation can occur because drilling students on narrow tests does not necessarily translate into broader skills that students will use outside of test-taking situations.
Furthermore, educators can be incentivized by high-stakes testing to inflate test results. At the extreme, numerous cheating scandals have now raised questions about the validity of high-stakes student test scores.
Without going that far, the now widespread practice of giving students intense preparation for state tests—often to the neglect of knowledge and skills that are important aspects of the curriculum but beyond what tests cover—has in many cases invalidated the tests as accurate measures of the broader domain of knowledge that the tests are supposed to measure.
We see this phenomenon reflected in the continuing need for remedial courses in universities for high school graduates who scored well on standardized tests, yet still cannot read, write or calculate well enough for first-year college courses. Statisticians, psychometricians, and economists who have studied the use of test scores for high-stakes teacher evaluation, including its most sophisticated form, value-added modeling VAM , mostly concur that such use should be pursued only with great caution.
Problems with the use of student test scores to evaluate teachers
The Job Evaluation process is used to set salary levels of all Scale 1 Professional Staff positions and Management positions. This process requires that all the conditions outlined under the Professional Staff Appointment Policy are met prior to submission of Job Descriptions for evaluation. Job Evaluation is a systematic method of assessing the relative sizes of jobs within an organisation by comparing a job or group of jobs with other jobs. Positions are measured in relation to each other, usually hierarchical and with related or comparable roles. The assessment process uses a set of criteria to evaluate a position.
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How to get the most out of your performance review
Businesses aim to build a successful product, or service, to sell and make their customers happy. This can be achieved if the company works in the right direction with perseverance. To grow a business you need to make key decisions related to investment, finance, marketing, human resources, and business operations, etc. Numerous business metrics can be tracked but the metrics selection depends on your business type, industry, and business goals. It helps in effective decision making for business management. It is important to note that business metrics address the business stakeholders, like; customers, managers, business owners, investors, and vendors.
How Managers Become Leaders
Harald not his real name is a high-potential leader with 15 years of experience at a leading European chemical company. As sales there soared, he soon won a promotion to sales manager. Three years later he returned to Europe as the marketing and sales director for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, overseeing a group of 80 professionals. Continuing his string of successes, he was promoted to vice president of marketing and sales for the polyethylene division, responsible for several lines of products, related services, and a staff of nearly Quite intentionally, the company had assigned him to run a small but thriving business with a strong team. The idea was to give him the opportunity to move beyond managing sales and marketing, get his arms around an entire business, learn what it meant to head up a unit with the help of his more-experienced team, and take his leadership skills to the next level in a situation free from complicating problems or crises.
Install Docker Engine on Fedora
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Try out PMC Labs and tell us what you think. Learn More. This paper is an attempt to describe and evaluate current methods for assessing the quality of medical care and to suggest some directions for further study. It is concerned with methods rather than findings, and with an evaluation of methodology in general, rather than a detailed critique of methods in specific studies. This is not an exhaustive review of the pertinent literature. Certain key studies, of course, have been included.
Random-access memory RAM is a valuable resource in any software development environment, but it's even more valuable on a mobile operating system where physical memory is often constrained. Although both the Android Runtime ART and Dalvik virtual machine perform routine garbage collection, this does not mean you can ignore when and where your app allocates and releases memory. You still need to avoid introducing memory leaks, usually caused by holding onto object references in static member variables, and release any Reference objects at the appropriate time as defined by lifecycle callbacks. This page explains how you can proactively reduce memory usage within your app. For information about how the Android operating system manages memory, see the Overview of Android Memory Management. Before you can fix the memory usage problems in your app, you first need to find them. The Memory Profiler in Android Studio helps you find and diagnose memory issues in the following ways:.
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