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Abstract Mobile agents are a distributed computing paradigm based on mobile autonomous programs. Mobile applications must balance security requirements with available security mechanisms in order to meet application level security goals. We introduce a trust framework to reason about application security requirements, trust expression, and agent protection mechanisms. We develop application security models that capture initial trust relationships and consider their use for mobile agent security.
Mobile agents are a distributed computing paradigm based on mobile autonomous programs. Keywords: Mobile agents, trust, security, application requirements, software protection, models, frameworks. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U. This material is based upon work supported in part by the U.
Army Research Laboratory and the U. All rights reserved. Mobile agents are autonomous programs with the capability of changing their execution location through a series of migrations and corresponding state updates.
Mobile agent applications specify and enforce security requirements based on the unique interactions of agent servers hosts with static and dynamic agent components. Traditionally, mobile agent security has focused on two forms of protection: keeping malicious parties from altering the agent and keeping malicious agents from harming other parties including potential hosts. Several surveys [1,2,3] categorize and describe attacks against agent systems along with mechanisms for defense. Trust formulation has been given considerable thought both in distributed networking applications [4,5,6,7] and mobile agents [8,9,10,11,12].
Mobility as an application feature complicates trust because the receiving execution host must make distributed trust decisions in the face of little or no prior knowledge. Likewise, user agents must evaluate trust with hosts in different security contexts. To date, other trust models for mobile agents have not addressed how to link requirements with appropriate agent protection mechanisms. Other trust models lack integration of generic security mechanisms or reasoning about initial trust relationships what we term an application security model.
We bridge this gap by posing a trust-based security framework for mobile agents with three novel features:. The rest of this paper describes our trust framework and is organized as follows: section 2 discusses related works concerning trust and security requirements in the mobile agent paradigm. Section 3 presents our framework for expressing trust and security in mobile agent systems. Section 4 expounds three different application-level security models and section 5 summarizes our contributions.
Our security framework novelly incorporates three notions: security requirements, agent security mechanisms, and trust. Security requirements are defined as the desire to guarantee one or more canonical qualities: privacy, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation. Security mechanisms for mobile agents enforce requirements and are categorized as either detecting or preventing malicious behavior.
Defining trust is as precarious as defining agent-and though researchers do not agree on either term they do discern the importance of both concepts in framing research.
We define trust loosely in a previous work [7] as the expectation of behavior among parties and classify several different trust infrastructures in dynamic networks. Gambetta [13] defines trust as a subjective probability that is non-reflexive, changing, and context driven. Trust can be transitive and therefore delegated [10] or can be acquired by direct observation [14,15]. Trust management [5] is a framework for defining policies, actions, relationships, and credentials in terms of trust.
Traditional trust management systems delegate permissions using certificates credentials that reduce to static decisions that do not scale well or allow change over time. Capra [15] points out limitations of several trust management frameworks: they are designed for centralized servers, have too high a computational overhead for mobile devices , lack dynamic trust evolution, lack details about local policy usage, and lack subjective reasoning capabilities.
Early work in mobile agent security centered on policy management and malicious code protection based on credentials [16]. Distributed policy tools for mobile agents are developed in [10,17]. Trust cannot be hard-coded in applications that require decentralized control in large scale heterogeneous networks [6]. Mobile agents particularly need to separate application purpose from trust management issues if they are to scale well.
Research efforts to implement trust expression in mobile applications include Lin et al. Our trust architecture incorporates several properties found in current work: derived and acquired trust opinions from third parties , delegated trust, linking trust with security decisions, temporal considerations, and non-Boolean trust. We fill in a key missing link in current models: the relationship between security requirements, trust, and agent protection mechanisms.
Tan and Moreau attempted one of the first models of trust and belief specifically for mobile agent-based systems in [8]. This distributed authentication mechanism model. Conversely, our model gives the ability to account for a wide range of mechanisms and requirements. To describe our framework, we first define the principals that can be assigned trust properties, define next the nature of trust relationships between principals, and finally formulate what trust relationships can accomplish in mobile applications settings.
Three distinct groups of principals are found in mobile agent systems: agents, hosts, and entities described in figure 1 in extended BNF3. We define an agent as a composition of static software code and a set of dynamic states state that represent the migratory results of the agent. Agents are described by their migration path itinerary , any unique identifiers id , a log of agent or host activity log , and a security specification policy that includes any historical trust information for other principals in the agent application.
Hosts provide an execution environment for the agent. They encompass the underlying physical hardware, runtime services, and middleware necessary for agent migration and execution. Agents see a host as a collection of computational, communicational, informational, and management resources. Hosts also have security policies that support the trust formation and decision process. Three classes of hosts are relevant to mobile computations: the dispatching host DH associated with the application owner that launches mobile agents, the executing host EH where mobile computations occur, and trusted hosts TH which have ability to change trust relationships among other principals based on services they offer.
Three entities have bearing on security relationships in mobile settings. The creator of the static agent code is the code developer CD while the code user is the application owner AO. The CD and AO may be the same. The owner of a computer, the systems manager of a computer, and the user of a computer can be the same person, or can be separate individuals with different levels of trust.
For simplicity, we view the host owner, manager, and user as synonymous and apply the term host manager HM to refer to all three responsible.
In human terms, we trust machines hosts and software agents in some cases because we trust the manager of the environment or the developer of the software. We equate the trust that we have in the host manager as the trust we have in any other host, realizing that the host manager for the dispatching host, the code developer, and the application owner can all be different entities.
We define an application as the collection of all possible hosts that will be involved in the agent task and the set of uniquely identifiable agents that implement a user function. This intuition captures single agents and multiple collaborating agents including those with the same static code and different itineraries and those with different static code.
We now define our notion of trust relationships that are shared among principals in our model. One security task is to rightfully attribute observed actions within the system to a given party. The data state and code of a mobile agent is influenced by the code developer, the dispatching host, and all visited hosts-making attribution difficult. For simplicity, we equate the trust in the agent code with trust in the code developer and we will equate trust we have in the dispatching host as the trust we have in the application owner.
Trust levels are non-Boolean and reflect a one-way subjective level of belief that one party will behave towards another party at some perceived level of malicious intent HU,U, ND,T, HT.
Foreknowledge F is a statement of prior interaction between principals. Agents traveling in a dynamic free-roaming itinerary can encounter hosts that. Likewise, hosts are likely to encounter agents with no prior experience. Well-known principals have established histories while known principals are identified for possible interaction.
Timeliness M is categorized as expired, stale, or fresh. Timeliness may be established by mechanisms such as timestamps [15] and freshness can be used to make determinations on whether recommended or delegated trust decisions are reliable. Given the same volume of interaction, trust is higher when the interaction period is longer.
When the elapsed time since the last interaction is short, higher confidence can be placed in more recent interactions. The list provides a comprehensive set of security requirements based on taxonomies found in [1,2,3]. Requirements dictate the security environment necessary for agents to operate at the executing host and the level of protection which hosts require from executing agents.
To achieve a security requirement, a principal must either have a degree of trust towards another principal in the system in regards to a given security requirement or else a security mechanism must be in place to enforce that particular requirement.
Trust level, foreknowledge, and timeliness bind trust from two principals an application owner, an executing host, a dispatching host, an agent, etc. Though we represent foreknowledge, trust level, and timeliness discretely, they can be converted to continuous ranges [-1,1] or [0,1] for example to accommodate different trust algorithms.
In our model, an application designer can specify varying levels of trust for different security requirements-giving freedom for the application to trust more in one security aspect but less in others. For example, principal A can trust principal B in regards to agent code privacy reverse engineering , but. IP agent itinerary privacy ensuring agent itinerary is secret other than previous or next host ID. We give three models in section 4 that describe classes of applications with varying levels of trust.
Security requirements formulate the desire to guarantee privacy, integrity, availability, authentication, or non-repudiation. Security mechanisms are targeted at enforcing one or more these requirements.
Both application owners and potential agent execution environments have vested interest in the mechanisms that are used to enforce security-whether they prevent or detect malicious behavior and what aspect of protection they provide.
No single security mechanism can address every security requirement for a mobile agent system. Some efforts have joined mechanisms and requirements at an application level [18] so that several mechanisms together enforce desired security levels. A large body of literature can be found that details proposed security mechanisms for mobile agent systems.
Though we are limited by space, thorough analysis of agent security mechanisms can be found in [1,2,3,12]. Host-based mechanisms protect a host from malicious agents and include sandbox-ing, safe interpreters, code signatures, state appraisal, proof carrying code, path histories, and policy management. Agent-based mechanisms protect the agent from malicious activity outside of itself and several commonly referenced mechanisms include encrypted functions, detection objects, replication with voting, reference states, time-limited execution, digital signatures, phoning home, anonymous routing, trusted third parties TTP , secure multi-party computation SMC , multi-agent systems MAS , intermediate data result protection, undetachable signatures, environmental key generation, execution tracing, and tamper-proof hardware TPH.
Wilhelm et al. A principal can have different trust levels for different requirements, e. When the desired trust level is not adequate between parties in the agent application, the presence of security mechanisms is used to enforce specific security requirements so that agent-based tasks can be accomplished.
Figure 4 lists various agent security mechanisms and the corresponding requirements they are intended to enforce. Though not an all-inclusive list of mechanisms, principals rely on such mechanisms to protect themselves.
Certain mechanisms are preventative in nature, not allowing malicious behavior a priori. Other mechanisms rely on a posteriori information to detect whether unauthorized actions occurred to either the agent or the host.
Noah Beery Jr.
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Episode 3184
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Abstract Mobile agents are a distributed computing paradigm based on mobile autonomous programs. Mobile applications must balance security requirements with available security mechanisms in order to meet application level security goals. We introduce a trust framework to reason about application security requirements, trust expression, and agent protection mechanisms. We develop application security models that capture initial trust relationships and consider their use for mobile agent security. Mobile agents are a distributed computing paradigm based on mobile autonomous programs. Keywords: Mobile agents, trust, security, application requirements, software protection, models, frameworks.
Sekethia L. Mcdonald, MD
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